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ABSTRACT
Malware family classification is an age old problem that many Anti-
Virus (AV) companies have tackled. There are two common tech-
niques used for classification, signature based and behavior based.
Signature based classification uses a common sequence of bytes
that appears in the binary code to identify and detect a family of
malware. Behavior based classification uses artifacts created by
malware during execution for identification. In this paper we report
on a unique dataset we obtained from our operations and classi-
fied using several machine learning techniques using the behavior-
based approach. Our main class of malware we are interested in
classifying is the popular Zeus malware. For its classification we
identify 65 features that are unique and robust for identifying mal-
ware families. We show that artifacts like file system, registry, and
network features can be used to identify distinct malware families
with high accuracy—in some cases as high as 95%.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer Communication Networks]: General – Secu-
rity and Protection; C.4 [Performance of Systems]: Measurement
studies
Keywords
Malware, Classification, Automatic Analysis.
1. INTRODUCTION
Malware family classification is age old problem that many in-
dustrial and academic efforts have tackled [16, 3, 8, 10, 17, 13,
18, 6, 11]. There are two common techniques used for classifi-
cation, signature based [14, 17, 6] and behavior based [8, 10, 13,
18]. Signature based classification is based on detecting a family of
malware by using a common sequence of bytes that appear in the
binary code. Behavior based classification is based on detecting a
family of malware based on the artifacts the malware creates dur-
ing execution. This paper will discuss a behavior based approach
to classification of a single malware family, the Zeus banking Tro-
jan [15, 12, 4], using several machine learning algorithms.
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In this paper, the main malware family that we study is the Zeus
Banking Trojan. The Zeus banking Trojan is a famous banking Tro-
jan that is used by cyber criminals to run a botnet to steal money,
credentials, and system resources from the infected victims. The
Zeus source code was leaked in 2011 and since than there has been
numerous variants that have surfaced [7]. Although the variants
have new add-on features that are not found in the original Zeus
banking Trojan, they all exhibit very similar behavior. Notable fea-
tures in the new variants of Zeus include bitcoin mining, peer-to-
peer command and control infrastructure, and added layers of en-
cryption to the configuration file.
The Zeus malware infects the system by writing a copy of it-
self to the APPDATA folder using a randomly generated file name.
The stolen data is stored under the same directory, APPDATA, en-
crypted [9]. When Zeus sends the stolen data to the command and
control server it deletes the local copy. Upon infection, Zeus injects
into explorer.exe process and other running system processes to run
out of. Zeus runs its main thread out of explorer.exe and commu-
nicates to the command and control server through explorer. New
variants using peer-2-peer continue to run out of explorer.exe pro-
cess but does not make any HTTP request. The Zeus banking Tro-
jan hooks several important Windows APIs to intercept data being
sent from the browser and to modify pages seen by the victim. For
example Zeus is capable of adding fields in web forms to collect
additional information from the victim when visiting banking site.
After Zeus infects a system and establishes a connection with
the command-and-control server, Zeus will download an updated
version of the configuration file that tells the bot what sites to tar-
get. The configuration file use to be stored in the same APPDATA
directory as the rest of the files. The recent variants of Zeus have
changed the storage area and storage method of the configuration to
protected from being discovered. We have observed with the new
variants of Zeus that the configuration file is encrypted and stored
in the registry under a random key name. The configuration file is
an important aspect of the Zeus banking Trojan and can reveal an
abundant amount of information about the Zeus campaign.
The configuration file can contain a list of backup command-and-
control servers, link to an updated version of Zeus, list of targeted
websites, and list of HTML and JavaScript to be injected in the
targeted websites. The configuration file information is important
because system administrators can block access to all domains used
for backup, targeted entities can be notified about a particular cam-
paign effecting their users, and security researchers can track the
infrastructure used by the attackers.
The reason Zeus is an important piece of malware is because it
is the most prevalent banking Trojan in the wild [5]. Zeus accounts
for most cyber crime targeting banks and small businesses, which
calls for further investigation on identifying malware samples that
belong to this family and exhibit new unique behaviors that we did
not see before. To this end, this work is dedicated to unveiling Zeus;
we identify a set of features in a large set of malware samples and
use them automatically understand this important family.
To this end, the contribution of this paper is as follows. First, we
report on our effort characterizing malware samples by automati-
cally analyzing binary codes in isolated environments using one of
our products, named automal, and further discuss a small dataset
obtained from this product. We identify a set of features that are
representative to families of malware, including Zeus. Second, we
use these features to automatically classify the different malware
samples into families, using various machine learning algorithms,
and report on both the efficiency and accuracy of the classification.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In §2, we discuss
the preliminaries of this study. In §3, we describe the dataset used
in the study. In §4, we report on the experiments, and highlight
the accuracy and error when using different machine learning algo-
rithms, some recommendations and observations. In §5 we review
some of the related works followed by the future work in §6.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this study we used five classification algorithms to understand
their capability in classifying different families of malware sam-
ples. In the following we review these algorithms.
• Support Vector Classification: (also known as support vec-
tor machine; SVM) is a supervised deterministic binary clas-
sification algorithm that assigns a label to input determin-
ing which of two classes of the output it belongs to. Given
a training set of samples (i.e., examples), each of which is
marked as belonging to one of two categories, the algorithm
builds a model that assigns each of the samples into one cat-
egory or the other. The algorithm maps different samples
as points in the vector space with a clear boundary between
them, then the algorithm maps samples to the space, and as-
sociate them with other samples that are closer to them. The
formal description of the algorithm can be found here [2]. In
the SVM algorithm, we use the L2 regularization (because
of the particular settings of our dataset and the number of
features) and L2 loss — for more details see section 4.
• Logistic Regression: [2] same as the SVM, logistic regres-
sion allows us to predict an outcome, such as label, from a
set of variables. The goal of logistic regression is to correctly
predict the category of outcome for individual cases using the
best model. For that, a model is created that includes all pre-
dictor features that are useful in predicting the needed label.
In our experiments, we use both L1 regularization and L2
regularization — In this study, we use both to identify the
better one for the given dataset size and set of features.
• Classification Tree: [2] (also known as decision trees, or re-
gression trees) is a model used for predicting the label by
mapping observations about the sample to the conclusions
about its target value. In the training part, the samples are
used to create a model in which a boundary is created for
each label based on the features. In the test part of the algo-
rithm, the decision model created earlier is used for identify-
ing which label is associated with the sample based on how
it is fitted on the classification tree.
• K-Nearest Neighbor [2] is a simple machine learning algo-
rithm used for classifying samples based on the closest train-
ing samples to them in the training feature space. Because
the algorithm is used for multiple classes, and our end goal
is a binary classification of two classes, we limit the size of
each cluster (class) discovered by the algorithm into the ideal
size of each class in the training algorithm (in such case, we
use equal size of samples in the training part; see details in
the experiments).
In the rest of this study we rely on an off-the-shelf implementation
of the aforementioned algorithms. We use mlpy [1] (stands for Ma-
chine Learning Python), which is a python toolkit that implements
several machine learning algorithms.
3. DATASET
A fundamental part in our contribution in this work is the dataset,
the set of features included in the data, the way we obtain the
dataset and the features, and the way we use for establishing a base-
line for the ground truth by manual classification. In the following,
we elaborate on the background of the dataset, the method used for
extracting the raw features used for the classification, the method
used for establishing a ground truth, and the baseline we use in our
experiments, including the testing dataset.
3.1 Background
In this section we recall some of the background we mentioned
in section 1 about the Zeus dataset. For our data set we used Zeus
Banking Trojan. As we mentioned earlier, the Zeus banking Trojan
is a famous banking Trojan that is used by cyber criminals to run
a botnet to steal money, credentials, and system resources from the
infected victims. The Zeus malware infects the system by writing
a copy of itself to the APPDATA folder using a randomly gener-
ated file name. The stolen data is stored under the same directory
encrypted in the APPDATA directory. In the following, we present
the method used for extracting features and artifacts that are repre-
sentative to the malware sample.
3.2 Raw and Vector Features Extraction
The data is a set of 1,980 sample of the Zeus Banking Trojan.
We ran these 1,980 samples through our automated malware anal-
ysis system auto-mal. The system auto-mal is a virtual machine
(VM) based system that is used to run samples of malware and cap-
ture behavior characteristics of that sample. The system enables
us to set a run-time for each sample that long enough to capture
enough artifacts about the sample; in our experiments we set the
time into 1 minutes (upon several trials, we realized that 1 minute
is enough for characterizing common samples). The auto-mal sys-
tem uses several tools for capturing and characterizing networking
traffic (IP address, port numbers, protocol types, and others — for
details see Table 1). Also, the auto-mal system uses tools, like
sluethkit, which is used for file system and registry artifacts. In
total, our system captures file system activities, registry activities,
and network activities. The malware activity artifacts are logged to
a MySQL database. We call those artifacts as raw features.
From the raw features, we obtain a feature vector for each mal-
ware sample. Most of the features consist of counts and normalized
data sizes that are used as features. For sizes, we consider the quar-
tile counts (e.g., how many of the specified artifacts have a size that
falls into the specified quartile of size generated by that malware
sample; i.e., for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quartiles in relation with
the file, for example, with the largest size). We have 65 features in
total most of which are network features, as shown in Table 1.
3.3 Sample Labeling
The Zeus Banking Trojan samples have been identified by hand
and collected over time by analysts—This process can be time-
consuming. At average, a previously unseen malware sample (not
Table 1: Features used in classifying malware samples.
Class features
File system created, modified, deleted, size (quartiles),
unique extensions, count of files under common
paths
Registry created keys, modified keys, deleted keys, count
of keys with certain type
Network see below for each sub-class
IP and port unique dest IP, certain ports (18 ports)
Connections TCP, UDP, RAW
Request type POST, GET, HEAD
Response type response codes (200s through 500s)
Size request (quartiles), reply (quartiles)
DNS MX, NS, A records, PTR, SOA, CNAME
necessarily Zeus) can take more than 10 hours to manually charac-
terize by experts. The data sources are from various AV vendors
that we have partnered with for sharing malware samples. The
malware feed is delivered with no AV signatures associated with
samples. We run Yara signatures on the malware feed to identify
malware of interest that we can feed into our automated malware
analysis system.
We also have an AV scanner appliance that scans each sample
going through our automated malware analysis system with 20 anti-
virus scanners. This helps us identify if other vendors think a sam-
ple is Zeus, Zbot, or a different family of malware. Our automated
malware analysis system has a memory forensics component that
allows us to run Yara signatures on volatile memory to identify a
specific family of malware based on strings in memory and byte
sequences known for a specific malware family. In the rest of this
paper, we did not use memory features, and leave using them as a
future work.
3.4 Baseline, Training, and Test Data
The methods mentioned above are used in conjunction to iden-
tify and verify that each sample is of the same family and that we
can use the behavior of these samples as features for the machine
learning algorithms. The Zeus data set is split up into 2 different
data sets one for learning and one for testing. The learning data set
contains 1001 samples of Zeus and 1000 samples of other malware
that is picked at random from our malware database collection. The
testing set contains 979 samples of Zeus and 1000 samples of non-
Zeus malware and that is not found in the learning data set. Notice
that the number of samples we use in this study is only to illus-
trate the idea, and is way smaller than the total number of samples
available to us. Classifying all samples is left as a future work.
4. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section we discuss the experiments and the results of this
study. Before going into further details, we outline the settings of
the experiments and the evaluation metric.
4.1 Settings and Error Measures
We ran the learning set, call it set A, through five different classi-
fication algorithms and tested the prediction on the testing set, call
it set B. The family of linear classification had a cost of constraints
violation set to 0.01. For the Class Tree classifier the minimum
number of cases required to split a leaf is set to 5. For the KNN
classifier the number of nearest neighbors are set to 980 (thus the
number of the classes we have is 2 for the kNN classifier).
Table 2: False positive and false negative when running the dif-
ferent classification algorithms.
Algorithm +/− (Zeus) +/− (Non-Zeus)
SVM 6.84%/4.29% 6.70%/4.20%
Logistic Reg. (L1) 11.03%/1.43% 10.81%/1.40%
Logistic Reg. (L2) 27.06%/2.55% 26.52%/2.50%
Decision Trees 4.70%/22.98% 22.52%/4.60%
KNN 10.21%/10.93% 10.71%/10.01%
To evaluate and compare the different algorithms we use the false
positive and false negative measures. The false positive error (false
alarm; for the class label Zeus, for example) measures the number
of samples marked as Zeus, while they are in reality not Zeus. On
the other hand, the false negative error (for the Zeus family) mea-
sures the number of samples that are marked as non-Zeus, while
they are in fact Zeus. Given that we are interested equally in both
classes (Zeus and non-Zeus), and that the number of samples that
are Zeus are not equal to the number of non-Zeus samples, we gen-
erate the error measures for both of them as percents (normalized
by the total number of samples in each class).
4.2 Results
Using the settings above, we run these algorithms on our dataset,
and computed the error measures (detailed in the previous section)
normalized by the number of samples in each class. The results are
shown in Table 2. From those results, we observe the following
(we verify some of those in the second experiment). First of all, we
notice that the L1 regularization option when used with the logistic
regression, is best suited for our dataset and the number of features
we have to give the best results represented by the lowest error
margin for both the Zeus and non-Zeus samples.
Second of all, we notice that the support vector classifier pro-
vides the best results among all for the combined false positive and
false negative measures, by identifying about 95% of the Zeus sam-
ples correctly and missing only around 5% of the samples at aver-
age, and by adding another 5% misclassified samples to the final
Zeus results. For the class of interest, the Zeus malware samples,
while the decision trees algorithm provides the best (overall) false
positive results, it provides a very high false negative (identifying
samples as non-Zeus, while they are in reality Zeus samples) thus
limiting its usefulness to the main purpose of the paper—correctly
and accurately identifying Zeus samples.
Finally, and while the false positive of the logistic regression
(with L2 for regularization) is very large (around 27% for both
classes; perhaps because the number of the samples we have in
relation with the number of the features is limited), we notice that
the false negative provided by the algorithm is among the lowest in
the study (about 2.5%, yet higher than the L1 regularization case),
which sheds light on its potential for identifying the class of in-
terest, and perhaps limit its drawback by combining it with other
algorithms that perform well for that class and that error measure.
One challenging problem when using machine learning tech-
niques for classifying data, particularly when using supervised learn-
ing techniques, is the choice of the training set. Starting with a well
classified dataset (with respect to the classification features) may
give nice results, or even starting with a poorly classified dataset
might by misleading by showing superiority of an algorithm over
another due to that fact, while in reality altering the initial learning
dataset may greatly alter the findings. To understand how our re-
sults are robust to the initial training set, we repeat the experiment
by flipping the test and training datasets. We flipped the sets and
Table 3: False positive and false negative when running the dif-
ferent classification algorithms.
Algorithm +/− (Zeus) +/− (Non-Zeus)
SVM 8.39%/8.39% 8.39%/8.39%
Logistic Reg. (L1) 7.29%/8.29% 8.29%/7.29%
Logistic Reg. (L2) 9.69%/11.00% 11.00%/9.69%
Decision Trees 4.90%/12.79% 12.79%/4.90%
KNN 12.29%/12.29% 12.29%/12.29%
made the B dataset as a learning set and the A dataset as a testing
set, and ran the five different classification algorithms again to get
the results shown in Table 3.
In this experiment, we confirm the following (among the initial
observations we made). First, we notice that the L2 regularization
still performs worse than the L1 regularization with the logistic re-
gression, establishing that the L1 regularization on the logistic re-
gression is well suited for our dataset for the reasons listed earlier.
Second, we observe that the (combined) performance of the SVM
is still the best among all algorithms we used, which is perhaps due
to the nature of our dataset: SVM performs well when the dataset
consists of two clear classes, and that happens to be the case of our
dataset. Third, unlike in the previous experiment, where the per-
formance of the decision trees indicates a limited benefits of it, the
false negative (of the Zeus class) when using the decision tree is
greatly less (about 10%) than in the previous experiment. Further-
more, the false positive is still same as in the previous experiment.
This final observation shows how critical it is to start with a repre-
sentative training set for the given classification algorithm.
Fourth, we observe the symmetry in the false positive and false
negative among the two classes and the different algorithms, which
happens as a result of the equal size of samples that belong to each
class in the testing dataset. Finally, we notice a limited difference in
the results of the kNN classification algorithm, which is among the
easiest to implement and run, indicating that, even when starting
from a biased (or less representative training set), the kNN algo-
rithm still provides reasonable results.
5. RELATED WORK
There has been plenty of work in the recent literature on the
use of machine learning algorithms for classifying malware sam-
ples [16, 3, 14, 10, 17, 13, 6, 12, 11]. These works are broadly
classified into two categories: signature based and behavior based
techniques. Our work belong to the second category of these works,
where we used several behavior characteristics as features to clas-
sify the Zeus malware sample. Related to work are the works
in [14, 8, 10, 13, 18]. In [10], the authors use behavior graphs
matching to identify and classify families of malware samples. In [13],
the authors follow a similar line of thoughts like ours for extract-
ing features, and use SVM for classifying samples. Their ground
truth relies on anti-virus reported classification which is mostly
signature-based, and they do not include manual classification like
in our case. Furthermore, the algorithms used for classification in-
clude only the SVM, which we tried along with other algorithms.
Their dataset does not include any Zeus samples, and thus does not
characterize this important malware family. The same work is ex-
tended in [14]. Our work is different from the prior literature in two
aspects. First, we limit our attention to understanding and classify-
ing the Zeus malware sample, which is, to the best of our knowl-
edge is not classified before. Second, to that end, our problem is
limited in nature; we only use techniques that are designed for 2-
classes classification problems, thus our error rates are smaller than
those reported in the literature for multi-class classification.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented preliminary results on classify-
ing Zeus, a popular malware family, using different machine learn-
ing algorithms. Much of the work is to be seen in the near future.
We are currently collecting a larger set of Zeus malware to be able
to run the algorithms on a larger set. We are proactivily identifying
Zeus banking Trojans and creating profiles for each new sample
that comes in so we have a larger data set. We are also combing
through our historical data to pull out samples that we might have
missed and variants that might exhibited similar behavior but not
exactly the same. We would like to run clustering algorithms on our
entire data base of malware to break the samples into clusters then
apply the memory signatures discussed earlier to label each cluster
and identify sub-families within each of the classes. Finally, in the
future we would like to combine different classification algorithms
with different weights to improve the classifications results.
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